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IN THE SUPREME CbURT
STATE OF UTAH

PAN ENERGY, a/k/a ENERGY CATALYST
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

]
i
]

vs.

]
i
]

CARL MARTIN,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No. 890400

]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from Decision in Favor of Defendant, June 12, 1989
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County
Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge

JURISDICTION

As a basis for its appeal, Pan Energy relies on Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (1986 Supp,)-

PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT

Appellant, Pan Energy, appealed

from the final order

rendered by the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Judge of the Fourth
Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County.

On appeal,

Pan Energy claims that the Utah Trial Court erred by dismissing

1

its action to enforce a judgment declared unenforceable by the
rendering court and vacating the judgment.!

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Respondent,
characterization

Martin,

of

the

disagrees

issues

with

presented

Pan

for

Energy's

review

and,

therefore, submits the following:

Issue I

Did the Utah Trial Court correctly afford full faith and
credit to the Oklahoma Court's order declaring the judgment
unenforceable?

Issue II

Does Utah's borrowing statute,
Annotated,
judgment

require dismissal
filed

in

Utah

§ 78-12-45, Utah Code

of the action

when

that

to enforce the

judgment

is

declared

unenforceable in the rendering sister state?

1

A copy of the Memorandum of Decision and Order are
marked Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively, and are contained in the
Addendum attached hereto and incorporated herein by this
reference.
2

Issue III

Was it within the Utah Trial Court's discretion to afford
comity

to

the

Oklahoma

decision

that

its

judgment

is

unenforceable?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Pan Energy's brief does not cite controlling constitutional provisions or statutes.

Nonetheless,

Martin relies on

the following:
A.

Constitutional Provisions.
Full Faith and Credit Clause -- Constitution of
the United Statesf Article IV, Section 1.
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof.

B.

Utah Code Annotated,
1.

Utah Borrowing Statute —* Section 78-12-45
Action barred in another state barred here.

When a cause of action has arisen in another state
or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the
laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse
of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained
against him in this state, except in favor of one
who has been a citizen of this state and who has
held the cause of action from the time it accrued.

3

2.

Applicable provision of the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act —
Section 78-22a-8,
Uniformity of interpretation.

This chapter shall be construed to effectuate the
general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pan Energy initiated its action in the Fourth Judicial
District Court for Utah County

(the "Utah Trial Court"), on

August 20, 1987, by filing a judgment rendered by the United
States District Court, for the District of Oklahoma, Northern
Division
September

(the "Oklahoma Court" or the "rendering court") on
21, 1982.

(Record

at

I).2

Though

Pan Energy

obtained its Oklahoma judgment on September 21, 1982, it took
no action to save that judgment as required by Oklahoma law.
(Record at 136) .

After the Utah filing of the foreign judgment, Martin
moved

to

stay

the

Utah

proceedings

to

challenge

enforceability of the judgment in the Oklahoma Court.
at 11) .

the

(Record

The Utah Trial Court granted Martin's motion and

^ Pursuant to Rule 24(e) of the Rules of the Supreme
Court, Martin has referenced pertinent pages of the original
record. Though the facts of this case should not be disputed,
Pan Energy has not made reference to the record and it is not
clear how Pan Energy supports its abbreviated version of the
facts. For purposes of this brief, Martin assumes Pan Energy
agrees with Martin's citations to the record.
4

stayed the enforcement proceedings pending a determination of
Martin's challenges by the Oklahoma Court.

Martin

successfully

challenge^

the

(Record at 17).

validity

of

the

judgment in the Oklahoma Court, which, on July 14, 1988, ruled
that the judgment was dormant and unenforceable.3

(Record at

133) .

Martin then asked the Utah Trial Court to vacate the
judgment and dismiss Pan Energy's 0tah action.
121).

(Record at

On June 12, 1989, the Honorable Ray M. Harding granted

Martin's

motion,

Energy's action.

vacated

the

judgment

(Record at 161-63).

and

dismissed

Pan

Pan Energy appeals from

that decision.

FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

1.

In 1982, Pan Energy, a Montana corporation, obtained

a judgment against Mr. Martin, in the United States District
Court for the District of Oklahoma.

Almost five years after

the judgment was rendered by the Oklahoma Court, Pan Energy
filed its judgment in Utah.

(Record at 1).

J

A copy of the Order entered by the Oklahoma Court is
marked Exhibit 3 and is contained in the Addendum attached
hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
5

2.

During

the

intervening

period,

Pan

Energy's

only

effort to enforce the judgment consisted of having a writ of
execution issued in the State of Idaho.

Though this writ was

issued, it was not executed or filed with any court.

(Record

at 133).

3.

Mr. Martin then sought to challenge the validity of

Pan Energy's judgment in the Oklahoma Court and enforcement in
Utah was stayed pending the Oklahoma Court's decision.

(Record

at 11-18).

4.
did

not

The rendering Oklahoma Court found that Pan Energy
take

steps sufficient

required by law.
save the judgment.

to enforce

its judgment as

Even the Utah filing was not sufficient to
(Record at 133) . Accordingly, the Oklahoma

Court held that the judgment was not enforceable.

(Record at

136) .

5.
ruled

Pursuant to Martin's motion, the Utah Trial Court

that

"where

the

judgment

has

been

held

to

be

unenforceable in the sister state, in effect, there is nothing
in existence to which full faith and credit can be given.
Motion to Dismiss and to Vacate is therefore granted."
at 161).

6

The

(Record

6.

Pan Energy now appeals from the ruling of the Utah

Trial Court dismissing the action and vacating the judgment
filed in Utah,

(Record at 161-63).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Issue I

Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution
requires that full faith and credit be given to the laws and
judicial proceedings of sister states.
Oklahoma

Court

unenforceable.

held

that

Pan

On July 14, 1988, the

Energy's

judgment

is

Full faith and credit must be given to that

decision.

Pan Energy's claim that full faith and credit only can be
given to the Oklahoma Court's original judgment, and not the
laws defining the scope of that judgment or the subsequent
judicial proceedings invalidating that judgment, is contrary to
both the intent and express letter of the Full Faith and Credit
clause.

The Utah Trial Court ruled correctly when it applied

full faith and credit to the Oklahoma Court's decision and
thereby

dismissed

the

unenforceable judgment.

action

to

enforce

Pan

Energy's

Indeed, it would be unjust to enforce

a judgment in Utah that cannot be enforced in the rendering
jurisdiction.
7

Issue II

While

Pan

Energy

attempts

to

clothe

its

appeal

in

generalized theorems of conflict of laws analysis, Pan Energy
has failed to address the implications of the Utah borrowing
statute on the facts of this case.

Conflict of laws analysis

requires consideration of Utah's borrowing statute, Utah Code
Annotated § 78-12-45, because the borrowing statute prevents
Pan Energy from using Utah law to add life to a claim otherwise
prohibited by the laws of the forum in which the claim arose.

The borrowing statute must be read in conjunction with
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.

The intent of the Foreign

judgment Act, inter alia, is "to effectuate the general purpose
of making uniform the law of those states which enact it.,f
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-8.

The Utah Trial Court's decision is

a proper use of the Utah borrowing statute and effectuates the
general intent of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.

Issue III

The Utah Trial Court has the discretion to afford comity
to the order of the Oklahoma Court.

General principles of

comity allow courts of one state to recognize the rulings of
the courts of another state as a matter of courtesy.
8

Such

courtesy

is not mandatory

under cofoity principles, but is

advisable for the development and continuation of harmonious
relationships between

the states.

The decision

to afford

comity is a matter of discretion, and such a decision only can
be overruled when it can be shown that the court clearly abused
its discretion.

The Utah Trial Cou^t afforded comity to the

decision of the Oklahoma Court.

Absent a showing of abuse of

this discretion, the Utah Trial Court's order must be upheld.

ARGUMENT

L

THE OKLAHOMA DECISION IS ENTITLED TO
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT.

Martin agrees with Pan Energy that full faith and credit
applies in this case.

The real question, however, involves the

manner of application of this principle, rather than the fact
of its application.

One must apply the law to the facts.

Pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, Utah
accords full faith and credit to the final determinations of
sister states.
709

P.2d

377

Data Management. Iny. v. E.D.P. Corporation,
(Utah

1985).

In this respect, the Oklahoma

judgment, in conjunction with all its rights, obligations and
restrictions, is entitled to full fai^h and credit in Utah.

If

the Oklahoma judgment was enforceable, Utah would be required
to accord that judgment full faith and credit, absent a valid
9

constitutional
Judgment Act,

challenge

to

the

judgment.

Utah

§ 78-22a-l et seq., Utah Code Ann.

Foreign

(Repl. Vol.

1987) .

In
determined

the

case

at

bar,

that, under the

however,

the

Oklahoma

laws of Oklahoma, the

judgment is not enforceable.

Court

Oklahoma

That Court's final determination

regarding its own judgment must be given full faith and credit
in

Utah.

Any

other

decision

would

create

the

peculiar

situation where a judgment declared invalid by the rendering
court continues to be enforced despite that court's ruling.
The Utah Foreign Judgments Act is designed to avoid such an odd
result.

Section

78-22a-8,

Utah

Code

Annotated,

states

that

"[t]his chapter shall be construed to effectuate the general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact
it."

To give a uniform effect to the Oklahoma laws, Utah must

recognize

the

unenforceable.

Oklahoma
If

it

decision

does

not,

rendering
the

the

Oklahoma

judgment

statute of

limitation regarding the enforcement of judgments is rendered
meaningless and this Court denies full faith and credit to
Oklahoma judgments and statutes.

10

The original Oklahoma judgment was granted in conjunction
with

all

that

enforceability.

state's

laws

effecting

its

validity

and

Utah should give full faith and credit to the

Oklahoma judgment; it should not add rights to the judgment
that Oklahoma would not provide.

The Utah Trial Court held:

After consideration of the memoranda submitted in this matter,
the Court finds that the Oklahoma judgment which is the basis
for this action has been held to be unenforceable in Oklahoma.
The Constitution of the United States requires that Utah give
full faith and credit to the judgments of sister states. Where
the judgment has been held to be unenforceable in the sister
state, in effect, there is nothing in existence to which full
faith and credit can be given. The motion to dismiss and to
vacate is therefore granted.
Memorandum Decision of May 17, 1989, Fourth Judicial District
Court for Utah County, Judge Ray M. Harding.

(Record at 161).

The Utah Trial Court's ruling insures a consistent and
uniform interpretation of laws of both Utah and Oklahoma.

The

Oklahoma determination is not circumvented and the purpose of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-22a-8 is achieved.

"Thus, full faith

and credit is insured, rather than denied, the law of the
judgment State." Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 191 (1966).

A.

Pan Energy Ignores The Fact Th^t The Utah Filing Did Not
Save Its Judgmeilt*
In the present case, the Oklahoma Court ruled that the

judgment was not enforceable, even though the Court knew that
the judgment had been filed in Utah.

Apparently, Pan Energy

presumes that once the Oklahoma judgment is filed in Utah, the
11

penumbra of rights, obligations and restrictions within that
judgment lose all significance.

A valid foreign judgment does become a Utah judgment upon
filing because Utah accords that judgment full faith and credit
under the Foreign Judgment Act.
seq.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l, et

The underlying premise for recognizing this judgment in

Utah, however, is that full faith and credit is accorded the
final

determinations

of

a

sister

state, nothing

less and

nothing more.

Utah will recognize valid foreign judgments and

enforce

in

them

this

state

only

to

the

extent

that

the

rendering state would do so.

Pan Energy's theory

in this action cannot be correct

because Pan Energy ignores the fact that the Utah filing did
not save the Oklahoma judgment.

The final determination of the

Oklahoma Court is that plaintiff's judgment is unenforceable
and cannot be revived.

Consequently, the Utah Trial Court's

dismissal of the action was proper.

B.

Instead Of Dealing With The Relevant Facts, Pan Energy
Hides Behind Irrelevant And Misconstrued Case Law
Rather than deal with the relevant facts of the case,

Pan Energy argues points of law which are irrelevant and in
some instances incorrect.

Pan Energy's procedural argument

12

regarding the Utah statute of limitations disregards the basic
facts of the case.

Pan Energy argues for enforcement of its invalid Oklahoma
judgment by clothing that judgment as a Utah judgment and
invoking an Erie-like doctrine regarding procedural enforcement
of a valid judgment.

Pan Energy might be correct if there was

a valid foreign judgment to which Utah should give full faith
and credit.

As the Utah Trial Court held, however, no such

judgment exists.

Pan
indicates

(Record at 161).

Energy
that

dogmatically
a

foreign

attacked on the merits.

recites Utah

judgment

cannot

case
be

law which

collaterally

(Brief of Appellant at 6-9).

Energy misconstrues Martin's positiorj.4

Pan

Martin attacked the

Oklahoma judgment in the rendering qourt on the grounds that
the judgment was unenforceable.

No collateral, or direct,

attack on the merits was made.5

4

Perhaps Pan Energy confuses Martin's position on the
enforceability of the judgment with the fact that Martin did
pay Pan Energy the full amount of the obligation upon which
Pan Energy obtained its Oklahoma judgment. (Record at 46, 4849, 64).
Clearly, Martin's payment of the underlying
obligation cannot serve as a defense at this point in the Utah
proceedings.
5

Indeed, Martin's attack on the merits has never been
decided by any court.
13

Pan

Energy

also

misconstrues

the

holdings

decided by the United States Supreme Court.

of

cases

For example, Pan

Energy cites M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312 (1839), as the
United

States

Supreme

Court's

"clear

expression"

of

the

"policies for the enforcement of foreign judgments in a sister
state."

(Appellate brief

at 13-14).

Far from being the

Supreme Court's clear expression on the matter, the reasoning
of M'Elmoyle has been questioned by the High Court.
Conway, 385 U.S. at 189, n.l.

Watkins v.

As the Court in Watkins points

out, the issue in M'Elmoyle "concerned the power of the states
to impose any statute of limitation upon foreign judgments."
Id.

The very

language cited by Pan Energy "must be read

against this argument."
proposition

that

Id.

states

M'Elmoyle simply stands for the

may

impose

their

own

statutes of

limitation on the judgments of sister states, nothing more.

Again, in citing Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,
514

(1953),

procedures

for

the

proposition

for enforcement

should

"that

the

be used

forum

345 U.S.
state's

rather than the

foreign state's", Pan Energy ignores the intent of the High
Court.

Wells specifically states that

We are not concerned with the reasons which have
led some states for their own purposes to adopt the
foreign limitation, instead of their own, in such
situations. The question here is whether the Full
Faith and Credit clause compels them to do so. Our
prevailing rule is that the Full Faith and Credit
clause does not compel the forum state to use the
period of limitation of the foreign state.

14

The Court's point is that the Full Faith and Credit clause does
not compel one state to adopt the statute of limitation of
another, but, a state may do so.

Indeed, that is exactly what happened in Watkins.

There

the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia Court's use of a Florida
statute of limitation in the Georgia Court's enforcement of a
Florida judgment.
Energy

The Supreme Courx: case law cited by Pan

stands for the proposition that states which impose

their own statutes of limitation on foreign judgments do not
violate the Full Faith and Credit clause.

These cases do not

find that one state must impose its own statute of limitation.
They indicate that one state may use statutes of limitation
from other states.

Utah's borrowing statute does just that.

(See Argument II. Dismissal of Plaintiff's Action was Required
Under Utah's Borrowing Statute, pages 16-19).

Pan Energy cites the case of Rhoades v, Wright, 622 P.2d
343 (Utah 1980), in support of its procedural claims.
cursory

reading

of

Rhoades

indicates

that

determined on the egregiousness of its facts.
widow

whose

Colorado

husband

had been gunned

the

Even a

case

was

There, a Utah

down by the couple's

landlord, was caught in a procedural bind between

decisions of Colorado and Utah courts.

Both the Utah federal

court and the Colorado state court procedurally barred this
plaintiff's

claims

prior

to
15

a

hearing

on

the

merits.

Recognizing the severity of the facts, the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
The implicit interest of Utah is, of course, in
assuring that heirs, either individually or
through a personal representative, have the
opportunity to recover compensation for the
wrongful death of a Utah resident.... Utah's
interest is even stronger in this case because
Utah must be viewed as the last forum available to
the plaintiff.
Id. at 347.

The Utah Supreme Court, recognizing the fact that this
was the Utah widow's last opportunity to be heard, used Utah
procedural law to give that plaintiff a forum.

If anything,

Rhoades supports the proposition that conflict of laws analysis
requires consideration of a state's interests, and to that end,
Utah law should be construed to protect Utah residents from
those who would manipulate procedural laws to their unfair
advantage.

Pan

Pan Energy is not a Utah corporation.

Energy

cites

the

Restatement

of

Conflicts

as

demonstrating that "the prevailing thinking in this area of law
is that the forum state applies its own procedures to enforce a
judgment that is correctly filed in the forum state."
Energy's Brief at 12) .

(Pan

Pan Energy, however, fails to identify

that Utah, the forum state, determines whether to enforce a
judgment by looking to its borrowing statute.
Utah Code Ann. (1987 Repl. Vol.).
"traditional

approach"

of

Further, while it may be the

American
16

See § 78-12-45,

Courts

to

distinguish

between substance and procedure, the trend is to weigh the
interest of the forum against that of the rendering state.
The view that statutes of limitations should
ordinarily be characterized as procedural has been
abandoned in many recent decisions.
Under these
decisions, the question whether a statute bars the
right and not merely the remedy has lost its
significance. The forum will no longer entertain a
claim with which it has otherwise no contact simply
because the statute is not barred by its own
statute of limitations. Entertainment of the claim
under such circumstances would disserve the forum's
general policy against the prosecution of stale
claims and would not serve any other forum
interest.
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §142 comment b (1971,

1988 Revisions).

See also, Rhoades. 622 P.2d at 347.

Pan Energy's "procedural" argument regarding enforcement
of a valid foreign judgment is not applicable to this case.
There is no valid foreign judgment to enforce.

Pan Energy

overlooks the fact that the judgment it seeks to enforce is
invalid in every other state of the union.

Pan Energy did

obtain an Oklahoma judgment.

Five years later, Pan Energy

filed that judgment in Utah.

The Utah Trial Court, however,

stayed the proceeding to allow the Oklahoma Court to determine
the

enforceability

of

the

i

judgment.

The

declared the judgment to be unenforceable.

Oklahoma

Court

The Utah Trial

Court recognized the unenforceability of Pan Energy's judgment
and thereby gave the final determination of the Oklahoma court
full faith and credit.

17

Accordingly, the Utah Trial Court properly dismissed Pan
Energy's

action

and

vacated

Pan

Energy's

unenforceable

j udgment.

II.

DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS REQUIRED
UNDER UTAH'S BORROWING STATUTE

Pan Energy's Brief is misleading in that no where in the
brief does it distinguish or even disclose the relevant statute
in this case.

Presumably, this is because the statute destroys

Pan Energy's claim.

The governing statute in this case is

Utah's borrowing statute.
When a cause of action has arisen in another state
or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the
laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse
of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained
against him in this state except in favor of one
who has been a citizen of this state and who has
held the cause of action from the time it accrued.
Utah Code Ann.. § 78-12-45 (1987 Repl. Vol.) (emphasis added).

Borrowing statutes were enacted to correct ''some of the
anomalies that resulted from treating statutes of limitations
as

procedural,

including

aggravated

6

examples

of

forum

The term "action1' as it is used in this section includes
the type of post-judgment proceeding Pan Energy initiated in
this case. Utah Code Ann.. § 78-12-46 (1987 Repl. Vol.) ("the
word 'action' as used in this chapter, is to be construed,
whenever it is necessary to do so, as including a special
proceeding of a civil nature").
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shopping."

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142

comment b (1971, 1988 Revisions).

Pan

Energy

judgment in Utah.
Energy

from

cannot

pursue

it^ unenforceable

Oklahoma

The Utah statute specifically precludes Pan

bringing

its

claim

against

defendant

in Utah

because that claim arose in Oklahoma and the time in which to
bring that claim has expired under Oklahoma law.

Under Utah

law, Pan Energy cannot use a longer Utah statute of limitations
to add life to a claim that would otherwise be governed by a
shorter foreign limitations statute.

The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted Utah's borrowing
statute in Lindsay v. Woodward, 299 P. 2d 619 (Utah 1956).

In

Lindsay, the defendant was injured in an automobile accident in
June of 1952.

Plaintiff, an Idaho physician who attended the

defendant, was not paid, and brought suit in a Salt Lake City
Court.

Plaintiff

obtained

defendant failed to answer.
District Court.

a

default

judgment

when

the

The defendant appealed to the

For the first time, he asserted a counterclaim

based on malpractice and alleged fraud and breach of contract.
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted and the
defendant further appealed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the

judgment because the defendant's counterclaim was time-barred
by

the

Idaho

statute

of

limitations,

and,

necessarily was barred by Utah's borrowing statute.
19

therefore,

In

the

case

at bar, the Utah

granted Martin's motion to dismiss.
that

its

statute

judgment

of

was

Trial

had

correctly

The Oklahoma Court held

unenforceable

limitations

Court

expired.

because

the

Oklahoma

Accordingly,

Utah's

borrowing statute required the Utah Trial Court to dismiss the
action.

The Oklahoma statute of limitations is codified at 12,
Oklahoma Statutes. § 735:
If execution is not issued and filed as provided in
Section 759 of this title, within five (5) years
after the date of any judgment that now is or may
hereafter be rendered, in any court of record in
this state, or if five (5) years has intervened
between the date that the last execution on such
judgment was filed as provided by Section 759 of
this title and the date that writ of execution was
filed as also provided in Section 759 of this
title, such judgment shall become unenforceable and
of no effect, and shall cease to operate as a lien
on the real estate of the judgment debtor....
(Record at 134). Since there was no execution on the Oklahoma
judgment within five (5) years from the date of its rendering,
the judgment was unenforceable.

Merely filing the judgment in

Utah before the limitations period expired could not save the
judgment under Oklahoma law.

The Utah borrowing statute requires our courts to look to
Oklahoma

statutes

Oklahoma

judgment.

to

determine

the

Thus, dismissal

enforceability

of

an

of the Utah action to

enforce the Oklahoma judgment was required.

III.

IT WAS WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION TO
AFFORD COMITY TO THE OKLAHOMA DECISION.

Even if the Utah Trial Court's actions were not required
under

full faith and credit, it w^is a proper use of that

court's discretion to afford comity to the Oklahoma Court's
decision.7

Judicial comity is a principle in which a court of

one state or jurisdiction gives effect to the laws and judicial
decisions of another, not as a matter of obligation, but out of
deference and respect.
10 (1979).

See 16 Am. Ju£. 2d, Conflict of Laws, §

*[T]he tendency of modern decisions is toward a

broader comity in the enforcement pf
legislatures of sister states.

rights created by the

A state court, in conformity to

state policy, may, by comity, give a remedy which the Full
Faith and Credit clause does not compel."

Id.

The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the decision to
apply comity rests within the sounc^ discretion of the trial
court.

Jackett v. L.A. Deot. of Water & Power. 771 P. 2d 1074

1

"In the review of judicial proceedings the rule is
settled that if the decision below is correct, it must be
affirmed, [even if] the lower court relied upon a wrong ground
or gave a wrong reason". Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295,
1300 n«3 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Helperina v. Gowran, 302 U.S.
238, 245 (1937)). Also, Jett v. Sunderman, 840 F.2d 1487, 1493
(9th Cir. 1988); Bruce vT United States, 759 F.2d 755 (9th
Cir. 1985); Morris~v. Adams-Millis cforp. . 758 F.2d 1352 (10th
Cir. 1985); Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 602 (9th Cir.
1984) .
21

(Utah App. 1989).
injured

in

a

In Jackett, the plaintiff, Jackett, was

helicopter

emergency

landing

in Utah.

The

helicopter was owned and operated by the defendant, L.A. Water,
a California governmental entity.
injury

against

L.A.

Water

and

Jackett brought suit for
gave

California's Governmental Claims Act.
complaint

against

timely

notice

under

He failed to file his

L.A. Water, however, within the two-year

statute of limitations required by the Act.

Jackett's claim

was time-barred in California and subsequently he filed suit
in Utah.

L.A. Water moved to dismiss Jackett's suit arguing that
as a matter of comity, Utah should apply the California twoyear statute of limitations.
Court

should

apply

the

Jackett argued that the Utah

Utah

four-year

tort

statute

of

limitations because normal conflict of laws analysis asserts
that the forum's statute of limitations governs.8

The trial

court agreed with L.A. Water and dismissed Jackett's complaint.
Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1075.

The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in
applying, as a matter of comity, California's two-year statute
of limitations.

The Utah Court of Appeals held that ''although

8

Apparently, Utah's borrowing statute, § 78-12-45 of the
Utah Code, was not applicable because it governs cases where
the claim arose in a foreign jurisdiction. Because the injury
occurred in Utah, the claim would be deemed to have arisen in
Utah, rather than the foreign state of California.
22

we

agree

with

Jackett's

analysis,

the

trial

court

may,

nevertheless, apply the discretionarjy doctrine of comity to
avoid the result otherwise compelled by a general conflict of
laws analysis." Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1076.9

In the present case, it cleartly was within the trial
court's

discretion

to

apply

thd

Oklahoma

statute

of

limitations.

CONCLUSION

The Court

should

affirm

the

ruling

of Judge Harding

which vacated Pan Energy's judgment ^nd dismissed Pan Energy's
action.

The trial court properly gavi full faith and credit to

the decision of the Oklahoma Court.

The rendering court has

ruled that the judgment is unenforceable.

That order must be

accorded full faith and credit.

Applying full faith and credit to the Oklahoma Court's
ruling does not create an unconstitutional dual standard for
the

enforcement

of

local

and

fordign

judgments.

Indeed,

through the use of Utah's borrowing statute, the Utah Trial
Court

properly

Judgment

Act.

adhered
A

to the

decision

9

intent of the Utah
to

enforce

the

Foreign

otherwise

"[CJourts have consistently fbund that the decision to
apply comity rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court." Jackett. 771 P.2d at 1075 (citations omitted).
23

unenforceable

Oklahoma

judgment

would

create

rulings under inconsistent applications of law.
Court avoided such inconsistency.

inconsistent
The Utah Trial

Its order should be upheld.

If for no other reason, the Utah Trial Court,s ruling
should be affirmed as a proper use of discretion to apply
comity

to the decision

of a sister state court.

General

principles of comity grant the Utah Trial Court the discretion
to recognize the rulings of a sister state court as a matter of
courtesy.

The Utah Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in

applying principles of comity.

Its ruling should be affirmed.

x-v UNDATED this c/g^ day of November, 1989.

VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
Brenda L. Flanders
Alexander H. Walker III
Kristin G. Brewer

( M a r t i n / B r i e f 3)

24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22^id day of November, 1989,
I served four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by
depositing the same in the United Stages mail, postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:

ZABRISKIE, PATTON & PETRO
Michael J. Petro
3507 North University Ave.
Jamestown Square, Suite 370
Provo, Utah 84604

-0&24^-4U^
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

PAN ENERGY, a/k/a ENERGY CATALYST
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 890400
CARL MARTIN,
Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from Decision in Favor of Defendant, June 12, 1989
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County
Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge

APPENDIX

V

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICfr COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FORtiJTAHCOUNTY
' &

*********************

PAN ENERGY, f/k/a
ENERGY CATALYST COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

CASEj NUMBER

CV 87-1916

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

-vs~
CARL W. MARTIN,
Defendant,

MEM0RANDUM DECISION

******•**••****•*•***

The Court, having considered defendant's motion to
dismiss and motion to vacate, will grant tn^u motion.
After consideration of the memoranda submitted in this
matter, the Court finds that the Oklahoma judgment which is the
basis for this action has been held to be unenforceable in
Oklahoma. The Constitution of the United States requires that
Utah give full faith and credit to the judgments of sister
states. Where the judgment has been held £o be unenforceable in
the sister state, in effect, there is nothing in existence to
which full faith and credit can be given. The motion to dismiss
and to vacate is therefore granted.
Counsel for defendant to prepare [an order incorporating
the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to filing with toe Court for signature.
Dated this 17th day of May, 1989,
BY ITHE COURT

2 ^ - e ^ u ^ . ^

;M. HARDING, JU^IZ

cc:

Mark 0. Van Wagoner, Esq,
Michael J. Petro, Esq.

EXHIBIT 1

1908 JAN -4 All & 43
FRANK R. PIGNANELLI 4392
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Defendant
48 Post Office Place
Third Floor, New York Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996

vv.'LLiAM F. HU ! S^. Cl L'SK
--^Q-fc.-j;:?£ plj^.
*""" ' u-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—
> —ooOoo
—
PAN ENERGY f/k/a
ENERGY CATALYST C O . ,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil N o . CV-87-1916

CARL W. MARTIN,
Defendant.
,—ooOoo
The parties, by and through their respective counsel of
Jeril B. Wilson for the Plaintiff, and Frank R. Pignanelli for
the Defendant, having entered into a Stipulation in the above
entitled matter, and said Stipulation being filed with the Court,
and for such good cause shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED J
1.

That the bond required for Defendant's Motion to Stay

Execution proceedings in the.above entitled matter is

in the

amount of $57,000.00.
2c

That said requirement of $57,000.00 bond for Defendant's

Motion to Stay Execution proceedings is hereby satisfied by a
letter of credit from a Utah banking institution, filed by

EXHIBIT 2.

Defendant, and draws against said letter of credit by plaintiff,
will be effective upon dismissal by this Cdurt as against
Defendant's Motion to Stay Execution by an^ Court of appropriate
jurisdiction over Defendant's Motion to St^y Execution.
3.

That Defendant will execute, on ar annual basis,

additional letters of credit in an amount 0qual to the amount
stated above in addition to the interest adcrued for a year based
upon statutory interest as required by the laws of the State of
Oklahoma as necessary during the pendency cif these proceedings.

2

F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
PAN ENERGY, f/k/a
ENERGY CATALYST CO.,

)
)
Plaintiff,

Silver, Clerk
DISTRICT COURT

Jack C
as#

)

V,

)

CARL W. MARTIN,

)
Defendant.

JUL 1 4 1988-

No. 82-C-496-B

)

O R D E R
This matter

comes before the Court on Defendant Carl W.

Martin's Motion to Extinguish Judgment.1
On September 21, 1982, this Court awarded Plaintiff judgment
against Defendant in the amount of $27,500.00. Subsequently, the
Plaintiff has filed the judgment in both Utah and in Idaho.

After

filing the judgment in Idaho a writ of execution was issued in
Idaho, but never

filed.

However, nothing

in the

Plaintiff's

response brief indicates an attempt to enforce this judgment in
Oklahoma.
Process to enforce a money judgment rendered by a federal
district court is usually a writ of execution under Fed.R.Civ.P.
69, with the procedure on execution conforming to the practice and
procedure of the state in which the District Court sits, except to
the extent that an applicable federal statute provides otherwise.2

The Court does not find authority to extinguish judgment. The
Oklahoma Statutes refer to a judgment becoming dormant.
2

For a list of federal statutes which govern executions, see
Notes of Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 69.

CYU1RIT 2,

7 Pt. 2 Moore's Federal Practice 569.04[3], citing Fink v. O'Neill,
106 U.S. 272, 1 S.Ct. 325, 27 L.Ed. 196

(1882).

The court

determines that no federal statute is applicable. Therefore, state
law governs on this issue before the court.
The effective duration of a judgment is ijimited by the state's
dormancy statute.

Oklahoma's dormancy statute is codified at 12

O.S. 1981 §735:
"If execution is not - issued and filed as
provided in Section 759 of this title, within
five (5) years after the date of any judgment
that now is or may hereafter be rendered, in
any court of record in this state, or if five
(5) years has intervened between thle date that
the last execution on such judgment was filed
as provided by Section 759 of thii title and
the date that writ of execution was filed as
also provided in Section 759 of iphis title,
such judgment shall become unenforceable and
of no effect, and shall cease to operate as a
lien on the real estate of thfe judgment
debtor...."
and §739:
"A. When a general execution is issued and
placed in the custody of a sheriff for levy,
a certified copy of such execution shall be
filed in the office of the county clerk of the
county whose sheriff holds such execution and
shall be indexed the same as judgments.
"B, If a general or special elxecution is
levied upon lands and tenements, the sheriff
shall endorse on the face of the writ the legal
description and shall have three disinterested
persons who have taken an oath to impartially
appraise the property so levied on, upon actual
view; and such disinterested persons shall
return to the officer their signed (estimate of
the real value of said property.
11

C. To extend a judgment lied beyond the
initial or any subsequent statutory period,
prior to the expiration of such period, a
certified copy of a general execution thereon
shall be filed and indexed in the same manner
as judgments in the office of the (bounty clerk

in the county in which the judgment was
rendered and in the office of the county clerk
in each county in which the judgment was filed
and the lien thereof is sought to be retained,"
Any Oklahoma judgment may become unenforceable if not executed upon
within five years from rendition of the judgment. First of Denver
Mortgage Investors v. Riqqs, 692 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Okla. 1984).

A

judgment creditor who files but does not execute the judgment in
Oklahoma cannot revive the judgment after it has become, dormant by
making a second filing.

Id. at 1362. A judgment becomes dormant

when the judgment creditor fails to obtain a writ of execution on
a judgment within five years of date of original judgment, even
though the judgment debtor had made several attempts to satisfy the
judgment by garnishment.

Chandler-Frates & Reitz v. Kostich, 63 0

P.2d 1287 (Okla. 1981).

Oklahoma strictly applies her dormancy

statutes to foreign judgments. First of Denver Mortgage Investors
v. Riggs, 692 P.2d 1358 (Okla. 1984).

Oklahomafs dormant judgment

statutes are to be strictly construed and the courts generally
refuse to engraft exceptions to them other than those contained in
the statutes themselves.

Thomas v. Murray, 49 P.2d 1080 (Okla.

1935).
If the judgment is not executed on within the five-year period
prescribed by statute, it becomes dormant and is not subject to
being revived. Oklahoma's revivor statutes, 12 O.S. 1961, §§ 1071,
1072 and 1077 were repealed in 1965 by Laws, 1965, Ch. 299, p. 535,
and an attempted revivor after that date is a nullity, except to
the extent of 12 O.S. 1971, §1081(b).
589, 590 (Okla. 1974).

3

Palmer v. Belford. 527 P.2d

The evidence before the Court reveals a yrit of execution was
issued in Minidoka County, Idaho on May 5, 1983, but was never
filed in Idaho nor in Oklahoma*

Plaintiff shows the execution was

placed in the sheriff's hands but was returned with no property
found.

The writ was never filed.

The Tenth

Circuit affirms the application of Oklahoma's

dormant judgment statutes. Inaerton v. First [National Bank & Trust
Co. , 291 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1961).

The statute is clear on its

face that a writ of execution must be issued ajnd filed in the State
of Oklahoma within five years from the da^e of judgment.

The

Plaintiff has not complied with the requirements of 12 O.S. 1981
§§ 735 and 759. Therefore, the judgment entered against Defendant
on September 21, 1982 is unenforceable.3

Defendant's Motion to

Declare Judgment Dormant is sustained.
IT IS SO ORDERED this

/'?"—

day of Jtftly, 1988.
/

THOMAS R. BRETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3

The Court does not rule on the enforceability of the judgment
in Utah or Idaho. That issue is determined by Utah's and Idaho's
law regarding foreign judgments and their enforceability.

4

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective until January 1, 1988].
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and
(v) the state engineer;
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
6

SUPREME COURT

78-g-2

(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but ihe
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).

78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here.
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or territory, or in a
foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon
shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who
has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the
time it accrued.
ffistory. L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-45.
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Article. IV.
Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be Droved, and the Effect thereof.

78-22a-8. Uniformity of interpretation.
This chapter shall be construed to effectuate the general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it.
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-8, enacted bv L.
1983, ch„ 169, § 1.

12, Oklahoma Statutes, § 735:
If execution is not issued and filed as provided in
Section 759 of this title, within fiye (5) years after
the date of any judgment that now id or may hereafter
be rendered, in any court of record in this state, or
if five (5) years has intervened between the date that
the last execution on such judgment was filed as
provided by Section 759 of this title and the date that
writ of execution was filed as also provided in Section
759 of this title, such judgment shall become
unenforceable and of no effect, anji shall cease to
operate as a lien on the real estate of the iudqment
debtor.•••

